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Abstract
Recent studies nd that cash remains a dominant payment choice for small-value trans-
actions despite the prevalence of alternative methods of payment such as debit and
credit cards. For policy makers an important question is whether consumers truly pre-
fer using cash or merchants restrict card usage. Using unique shopping diary data, we
estimate a payment choice model with individual unobserved heterogeneity (demand-
side factors) while controlling for merchants' acceptance of cards (supply-side factors).
Based on a policy simulation where we impose universal card acceptance among mer-
chants, we nd that overall cash usage would decrease by only 7.7 percentage points,
implying that cash usage in small-value transactions is driven mainly by consumers'
preferences.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, as new payment technologies such as mobile payments and contactless credit
cards have been developed, consumers' method of payment choice has attracted the attention
of a wide range of private rms { credit-card-issuing companies, credit and debit network
providers, and mobile phone companies { as well as researchers and policy makers. Despite
the emergence of these new technologies, cash retains its dominant position at the point-of-
sale, in particular, for small-value transactions. This phenomenon is found all over the world.
For example, recent studies on consumer micro-payments by Klee (2008) and Arango, Huynh,
and Sabetti (2011) reveal that in the U.S. and Canada, respectively, cash is the dominant
payment method for transactions of less than 25 dollars. At the same time, these authors
also report that the use of credit and debit cards increases as transaction values increase.
Similar ndings are also documented by Bolt, Jonker, and van Renselaar (2010) and Simon,
Smith, and West (2010) for the Netherlands and Australia, respectively.
This dominance of cash usage for small-value transactions at the point-of-sale might be
partially supply driven: To avoid interchange fees, merchants tend not to accept credit or
debit cards for small-value transactions.1 At the same time, however, it might be demand
driven: Many consumers prefer paying in cash for its ease of use and speed of settlements.
Such observations bring up the following question: How would consumers pay at the point-
of-sale if the government regulated merchant fees of credit and debit cards to a very low
level so that all merchants would be willing to accept any cards? Answering this question is
challenging because it is dicult to separately identify supply-side and demand-side factors
in payment choices. The distinction, however, is essential for understanding the mechanism
of demand for cash and for answering various policy-oriented questions.2
This paper attempts to answer these questions by estimating a model of consumers'
payment choices at the point-of-sale, using unique Canadian data based on three days of
shopping diaries. The data have two key features: multiple observations per subject, and
1In Canada, merchants pay a small xed fees to network providers for each debit card transaction.
2For instance, policy makers are required to understand the substitution between cash and other payment
methods to discuss potential regulation on surcharges and interchange fees to implement a socially optimal
payment system. As a sole issuer of the bank notes, central banks also needs to understand the substitution
patterns to predict the cash demand.
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\perceived" acceptance. First, since the survey keeps track of the shopping diaries at the
individual level, we can observe multiple transactions for each individual with slightly dif-
ferent shopping contexts, in terms of shopping types and transaction values. Observing only
one transaction per subject would not be enough to identify the individual-specic eect
of choosing a particular method of payment. In the data, however, we can observe mul-
tiple transactions for each individual, which enables us to model consumer heterogeneity
in payment choice. Second, consumers report the methods of payment that would have
been accepted at each shopping opportunity, as well as the actual method of payment used.
Although this self-reported information might contain measurement error and might not
be perfectly exogenous, it is still useful in limiting the consumers' choice sets. These two
features of the data, as a result, enable us to separate the demand-side factors from the
supply-side factors.
Payment choice is modeled as a generalized multinomial logit (G-MNL) model, proposed
by Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, and Wasi (2010), to capture the heterogeneity observed in the
data. A close look at the data shows that consumers can be potentially categorized into four
groups: (i) consumers who only use cash (cash users), (ii) consumers who use debit cards
whenever they are accepted and cash otherwise (debit users), (iii) consumers who use credit
cards whenever they are accepted and cash otherwise (credit users), and (iv) consumers who
use all three methods of payment (mixed users). This observation suggests that some sets of
consumers have strong preferences for a particular method of payment, such as credit cards
or debit cards, and use them whenever these methods are accepted by merchants. Another
type of heterogeneity in payment choice is heterogeneous thresholds: Some people within the
same category might choose dierent payment methods when they are faced with the same
transaction values and types.3 In the G-MNL model, we can capture such heterogeneity
by introducing scale coecients { scaling up/down the utility of one particular method of
payment { and random coecients { changing substitution patterns among alternatives.
The importance of such consumer heterogeneity in payment choices is conrmed in the
estimation results. The estimation results show that the parameters that govern individual
3 For example, some credit users might choose credit cards even for a $5 transaction, whereas others
might use credit cards only for transactions above $20. Similarly, within the category of mixed users, their
payment choice between credit and debit cards might be random across individuals.
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heterogeneity are statistically and economically signicant. Moreover, the Akaike informa-
tion criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), both of which measure
the goodness of t of a model, improve dramatically by including such heterogeneity.
Using the estimated model, we conduct a policy experiment where all merchants accept
any payment method regardless of the transaction value. This policy experiment can be
interpreted as follows: Suppose the government regulates merchant fees to a very low level,
possibly zero, so that all merchants are willing to accept credit and debit cards for all
transactions. In this scenario, every consumer could use his preferred method of payment at
any merchant. Would consumers still use cash?
We demonstrate that overall cash usage would decrease by about 7.7 percentage points in
terms of transaction frequency and by 7.5 percentage points in terms of transaction values,
whereas the model without any individual heterogeneity predicts smaller changes in both
transaction frequency and values. This dierence can be explained as follows: Without
taking individual heterogeneity into account, homogeneous consumers would not use cards
as frequently for small-value transactions. Taking individual heterogeneity into account,
however, some people who truly prefer using credit and debit cards would use these cards
even for small-value transactions under the counterfactual scenario, leading to the slightly
larger decrease in overall cash usage. Moreover, the relatively smaller decreases in cash usage
in any model can be also interpreted to mean that cash usage in small-value transactions is
driven mainly by the demand side, i.e., consumers would often choose to pay with cash even
if all merchants accepted credit and debit cards.
Furthermore, the simulation results can be also translated into welfare changes, in par-
ticular, for rms.4 5 As for the credit card industry, the total value purchased through Visa
and MasterCard in Canada in 2009 was about 264 billion dollars comprising 2.51 billion
4 As for consumer surplus, we cannot quantify the change in monetary terms due to the absence of `price'
for choosing a certain method of payment. Unlike the standard discrete choice models in dierentiated
product markets, the choice of payment method does not incur any explicit costs, so we cannot calculate the
willingness to pay for switching from one payment choice to another. However, judging from the relatively
small shift from cash to other payment methods demonstrated above, we can conclude the welfare gain for
consumer side would not be very big.
5In subsequent analysis, when we calculate the fees paid by merchants to merchant acquirers (or card
network providers), we use the median merchant fees on credit and debit cards reported by Arango and
Taylor (2008). These fees were 2.0% of the transaction value for credit cards and 0.12 dollars per transaction
for debit cards, according to the Bank of Canada's 2006 survey of merchants on accepted means of payment.
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transactions, yielding approximately 5.28 billion dollars in fees paid by merchants to credit
card acquirers.6 Under the counterfactual scenario, the total value purchased would be 303
billion dollars comprising 3.09 billion transactions, yielding approximately 6.06 billion dollars
in fees. The scenario in the debit card industry is similar. The total value purchased through
Interac, a not-for-prot organization which solely oers a debit card network in Canada, was
171 billion dollars comprising 3.88 billion transactions, yielding approximately 0.466 billion
dollars in fees paid by merchants to debit card acquirers.7 Under the counterfactual scenario,
the total value purchased would be 182 billion dollars comprising 4.41 billion transactions,
yielding approximately 0.529 billion dollars in fees. Thus, merchants would need to pay 843
million dollars more in fees to credit and debit card acquirers, which can be viewed as the
cost of implementing universal card acceptance: All merchants would be willing to accept
cards if the additional cost were compensated by the government.
Research on micro-payments has attracted attention from many sources: major retail
stores, mobile phone companies, credit card companies, credit card network providers, com-
mercial banks, policy makers, and central banks. Traditional payment methods { cash, and
credit and debit cards { face increasing competition from newly emerging payment methods
such as online payments and mobile phone payments. Because of the need to understand
the substitution between these payment methods, many empirical studies, as well as some
theoretical studies, attempt to reveal the substitution between cash, credit cards, and debit
cards.8 For example, Schuh and Stavins (2010) focus on the extinction of check usage in the
U.S., while Ching and Hayashi (2010), Simon, Smith, and West (2010), Arango, Huynh, and
Sabetti (2011), and Sieber (2011) examine the role that credit cards' reward programs play
in the choice of payment method. Rysman (2007) asks why people use only one credit card,
even though they carry several credit cards in their wallet. Borzekowski, Kiser, and Ahmed
(2008) and Zinman (2009) study debit card usage.9 The most recent work by Koulayev,
Rysman, Schuh, and Stavins (2012) develops a structural model of adoption and use of pay-
6See http://www.cba.ca/en/component/content/publication/69-statistics.
7See http://www.interac.ca/media/stats.php.
8Theoretical studies include the monetary theoretic approach, as in Telyukova and Wright (2008) and
Monnet and Roberds (2008), and the two-sided market approach, as in Rochet and Tirole (2002), Rochet
and Wright (2010), and Shy and Wang (2011).
9For a more comprehensive survey, see Humphrey (2010).
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ment instruments to examine the eect of the U.S. regulation of interchange fees on debit
cards. This paper, however, contributes to this empirical literature by studying consumers'
unobserved heterogeneity in payment choices and examining their counterfactual aggregate
demand for cash, using unique data on perceived acceptance and multiple observations per
subject.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and gives some sum-
mary statistics and motivating facts for the modeling framework. In Section 3, we present
the model and the estimation procedure. The estimation results and the counterfactual
simulation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Background Information
2.1 The 2009 Method of Payment Survey
Data Description and Sample Construction The data used in this study are from the
2009 Bank of Canada Method of Payment Survey. The survey consists of two parts: a survey
questionnaire and a three-day diary survey instrument.10 The survey questionnaire (hereafter
SQ) includes some questions about demographic information, such as age, annual income,
gender, education level, marital status, employment status, and so on. Moreover, it includes
information about respondents' main bank account and main credit card, which enables us
to associate their payment choices with the number of free debit transactions per month,
and credit card rewards and annual fees.11 SQ also contains some attitudinal information,
such as perceptions of convenience and safety for some particular methods of payment. This
study includes such attitudinal data as explanatory variables, since the importance of such
attitudinal data is emphasized in Harris and Keane (1999) and Ching and Hayashi (2010).
The diary survey instrument (hereafter DSI) asks about shopping data, including the
transaction value, type of transaction, the perceived accepted methods of payment, the
10Originally, there were about 6,900 respondents to the survey questionnaire, and among them about 3300
respondents proceeded to the diary survey instrument. For this study, we need both sets of information and
use the respondents who nished both.
11In Canada, about half of bank accounts oer unlimited free debit card transactions, whereas the remain-
ing bank accounts oer only limited free or zero free debit card transactions. For the latter type of accounts,
consumers need to pay some fees after exceeding the limit on free debit card transactions.
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method of payment chosen, and the major reasons for their choice, for three consecutive days.
There are two strengths of these data: (1) multiple observations per subject and (2) perceived
acceptance. As for the rst feature, the data provide multiple shopping observations for
each individual with slightly dierent shopping opportunities, which allows us to study the
source of individual heterogeneity. Compared with other studies using transaction-level
(micro) data such as Klee (2008) and Arango, Huynh, and Sabetti (2011), we can extract the
individual heterogeneity more readily with this survey data. Observing multiple shopping
opportunities allows us to have individual-specic eects for method of payment choice.
Moreover, perceived acceptance, another feature of these data, is also a prominent aspect
of this survey. When consumers give details for each transaction, they need to state what
payment methods would have been accepted. Knowing this information, we can limit the
choice sets for each transaction. Therefore, together with the characteristics of the multiple
observations per individual, we can separate the demand-side factors from the supply-side
factors.
Since the sample is not representative, we need to use a sample weight to correct the
sampling bias.12 Moreover, the analysis is restricted to the subset of the original samples.13
We construct the sample by excluding consumers who have missing information regarding
the perceived acceptance, demographics, and transaction value, which are key variables in
this study. Moreover, in order to estimate a random eects model, we need to have at least
three shopping observations per subject to identify the individual-specic eect. Thus, we
also exclude the samples with fewer than three shopping observations. This process leaves a
total of 1,452 individuals with 7,908 transactions.
Canadian Payment Landscape Figure 1 shows the frequency of payment choice by
transaction value. The black solid line, the blue dotted line, and the red dashed line show
the frequency of cash, credit card and debit card usage, respectively. For example, if the
transaction value is about $10, then 60%, 25%, and 15% of transactions are completed by
cash, debit and credit cards, respectively. Notice that if the transaction value is less than
$25, cash usage dominates other payment methods, namely credit and debit cards, and this
12For more details, see Arango, Huynh, and Sabetti (2011) and Arango and Welte (2012).
13For more detailed sample construction procedure, see Appendix.
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dominance is reversed as the transaction value increases, as Arango, Huynh, and Sabetti
(2011) point out.
In the following subsection, we show some summary statistics and descriptive statistics
to motivate why this study uses a generalized multinomial logit model, focusing on the
heterogeneity in payment choices observed in the data.
2.2 Heterogeneity in Payment Choice
Table 1 shows how many shopping trips each individual made over the three days. The second
and fth, and the third and sixth columns display the unweighted and weighted percentage
of consumers depending on the number of shopping trips, before and after truncating the
data by the number of shopping trips. These four columns suggest that the shape of the
histogram would not change dramatically, even though we use the unweighted samples.
Moreover, not surprisingly, each individual makes 4.03 shopping trips over the three days
on average, implying that there is more than one shopping trip per day, and about half of
them have at least four shopping trips.14 The fact that we have multiple transactions per
person immediately raises a question: Are there any individual-specic patterns in payment
choices?
We show consumers' tendency toward payment choice in Table 2. To construct this table,
rst we categorize the samples into four types by their method of payment choice patterns,
regardless of the number of shopping trips. Four types can be found in the rst column: (1)
Cash users, who use only cash, displayed in the rst row, (2) Debit users, who mainly use
debit cards, and cash in some cases, displayed in the second and third rows, (3) Credit users
who mostly use credit cards, and cash in some cases, displayed in the fourth and fth rows,
and (4) Mixed users who use credit and debit cards, and cash, displayed in the sixth and
seventh rows. Then, we count the number of individuals who fall into each category and
calculate the number of shopping trips and average transaction values, depending on their
types. There are three important observations in this table.
14This is after dropping observations that are missing perceived acceptance. If we calculate the average
shopping trips in the original data, we nd that this number should be about 4.7 times per person over the
three days.
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The rst and most important observation is the fact that the fractions of debit users
and credit users are sizeable, accounting for one-third and one-fourth, respectively. This
observation suggests that the substitution between credit and debit cards is very small for
those committed users. Small changes in transaction values or in the characteristics of
transactions are not necessarily enough for them to switch their payment methods from
debit to credit or credit to debit. Thus, the model should take into account the individual-
specic eects for their preferred payment methods.
Second, there are some mixed users who use all three methods quite randomly. Although
the average number of shopping trips is larger than the corresponding number for other types,
the average transaction values for them are not so dierent from the corresponding numbers
for credit users. Moreover, as Figure 2 suggests, the distribution of transaction values is
quite similar to each other, though their payment choices are quite dierent. Moreover, we
also show each consumer type's payment choice by transaction values in Figure 3. Thus,
their preferences should be dierent from credit users preferences, which should be captured
by the model.
As a nal remark about Table 2, the distribution of consumer types will be preserved
if we limit the samples to consumers with more than 1 shopping opportunity. In order to
extract individual-specic eects, e.g., xed eect estimators and/or random eect estima-
tors, each sample should have multiple observations for identication purposes. Thus, to
model the heterogeneity mentioned above, we need to discard the samples. To see not only
the average but also the distribution of transaction values, we also show the distribution
of transaction values depending on the type of consumer, demonstrated in Figure 2. The
average transaction values and the distribution of the transaction values for each type of
consumer are quite similar to each other, implying that consumers with more than three
shopping trips are still representative for each type of consumer. Therefore, we estimate the
model using the samples with more than two shopping opportunities.15
15In order to check the robustness of the results, we also estimate the model using samples with more than
six shopping trips.
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2.3 Perceived Acceptance
In addition to the consumer's side, we also describe supply-side information, \perceived
acceptance," which is reported by consumers. Although it might have some measurement
errors, it is still useful in separating consumers' preference in choosing the method of payment
from supply-side factors. Table 3 shows the acceptance of debit and credit cards depending
on consumer type. For example, cash users had 1,086 shopping trips in total, and they faced
283 situations where neither debit cards nor credit cards were accepted. Similarly, they could
use only cash and debit cards 255 times, and they could use only cash and credit cards 53
times; for the rest of 459 shopping trips, they could use all three methods.
According to Table 3, we can see that the distributions of acceptance are dierent from
each other depending on the type of consumer. For example, debit users are more likely to
go to shops that accept debit cards than are credit users, and credit users are more likely
to go to shops that accept credit cards than are debit users. However, the dierences are
quite small between credit users and mixed users. On the other hand, the distributions
for cash users and debit users are slightly dierent from those for other types of people,
i.e., they are more likely to go to shops that accept debit or credit cards than are other
types of consumers. This dierence suggests that there is a potential endogeneity problem,
that is, people who prefer using cards might choose shops where these cards are more likely
to be accepted. However, the relative number of cash users is small compared to other
types, and the patterns of distribution of acceptance are similar to those for other types,
i.e., the highest frequency occurs when both credit and debit cards are accepted, and the
second highest frequency occurs at shops where neither is accepted, except for debit users.
Therefore, this study treats all samples equally in the estimation and we further discuss the
potential endogeneity problems in Section 4, together with other issues.
2.4 Attitudinal and Other Demographic Variables
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to rate the usage of cash, credit cards, and
debit cards for (1) the ease of use, and (2) record keeping capabilities, using a ve-point
scale, e.g., a respondent needs to choose a number from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
10
agree) to rate the ease of use for each method of payment. We normalize those two ratings
by cash. That is, each index for credit card and debit card usage is obtained by
ai;j;l = log

ri;j;l
ri;cash;l

where ri;j;l is the rating of individual i for payment method j, j = credit and debit, and l
denotes the ease of use or record keeping. Taking logarithm normalizes the indexes so that
ai;j;l can take a value between  1:6094 to 1:6094, and 0 if payment method j is identical to
cash.
Figures 4 and 5 graphically show the respondents' attitudinal and perceptual data, using
3-dimensional histograms. For example, Figure 4 shows that many respondents are located
at the center, at the point of (0; 0), implying most of them think the ease of use for all
three methods are the same. On the other hand, Figure 5 shows that many respondents are
located north of (0; 0), implying that credit and debit cards are more convenient as a record
keeping device than cash.
3 Econometric Model
This section provides a payment choice model for consumers. As indicated in Section 2,
consumers' payment choice is a discrete outcome variable. Thus, given the discrete nature of
the data and motivated by some patterns observed in Section 2, this paper uses a generalized
multinomial logit model, as proposed by Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, and Wasi (2010).16 As
a benchmark case, we also estimate a series of multinomial logit models to compare the
estimation results and statistical tness of the model.
16There exist other approaches: semiparametric and nonparametric approaches. For example, after the
pioneering work of Manski (1975), Briesch, Chintagunta, and Matzkin (2002) use a semi-parametric method,
known as maximum score estimator, to extract unobserved heterogeneity in discrete choice models. More
recently, Fox (2007) shows that the semiparametric estimator is consistent when using data on a subset
of choices. Similarly, Briesch, Chintaguanta, and Matzkin (2010) use nonparametric approach to extract
unobserved heterogeneity in discrete choice models.
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3.1 Payment Choice Model
Suppose the utility function for individual i, i = 1; 2;    ; N , at shopping trip t, t =
1; 2;    ; Ti, from choosing payment method j 2Jit is given by:
uijt = j +Zit
Z
i +Aij
A
i +Di
D
i + "ijt; (1)
where j is a payment method specic constant term, Zit is an MZ-dimensional vector
of shopping characteristics, Aij is an MA-dimensional vector of individual i's attitudinal
characteristics toward the payment method j, Di is an MD-dimensional vector of individual
i's demographic information, i = [
Z
i 
A
i 
D
i ] is a coecient vector, and "ijt is an i.i.d.
random utility shock that follows a Type I extreme value distribution.17 Each individual i
chooses a payment method j which gives the highest utility at shopping trip t. As a matter of
convention, the utility from using cash is normalized as zero, i.e., we assume that ui;cash;t = 0.
For notational simplicity, we use X ijt = [Zit Aij Di], which gives us a standard notation of
the utility:
uijt = j +X ijt
0
i + "ijt:
Though i may depend on a payment method j, we suppress the subscript for transparency.
Here, we specify an m-th element of i as
im = i m + im + (1  )iim; where im  N(0; um) (2)
i = exp( + i0); where i0  N(0; 1); (3)
where im is individual-specic deviation from the mean, which follows a standard normal or
log-normal distribution, i is a scale heterogeneity, which follows a log-normal distribution,
17As Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, and Wasi (2010) point out, a choice specic constant term, j , cannot be
individual-specic, i.e., we cannot identify when j is replaced by ij . This problem is known as \incidental
parameter problem," studied by Neyman and Scott (1948) and thus we explicitly write j separately from
other characteristics. For more details, see Lancaster (2000) which is a comprehensive survey of this issue.
Moreover, a recent study by Fox, il Kim, Ryan, and Bajari (2012) shows that the distribution of the random
coecients in the multinomial logit model is nonparametrically identied, and we can straightforwardly
apply their identication argument to this model.
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and  is a mixing parameter that decides the degree of two heterogeneous eects.18 As for
a scaling heterogeneity i, we use an exponential operator to avoid negative scaling and 
can be seen as a scaling parameter, because it essentially changes the absolute scale of i.
we explain the roles of these two heterogeneity parameters below.
In the standard (multinomial) logit model, im = m, which implies that all individuals
have exactly the same taste for all characteristics. As repeatedly emphasized in this paper,
however, the data show heterogeneity in payment choice. Thus, as in equation (2), the
model includes two heterogeneity parameters: i and i, where i = [i1;    ; iM ]. To see
the importance of i, assume that i = 1 and  = 1. Then, equation (2) can be simplied
as
Mixed (Heterogeneous) Logit: im = m + im; where im  N(0; um);
cf. A Standard Logit: im = m:
Now, it is clear that the m is a mean valuation for m th characteristics and the im is an
individual specic taste deviation from the mean in payment choice. For example, suppose
each shopping trip is characterised by its transaction value and consumers only care about
the transaction value (TV) when they make a decision. Some consumers who use credit
cards regardless of the transaction values and rarely use cash have higher values of i;TV ,
whereas consumers who only use cash have smaller (or negative) values of i;TV . Therefore,
this term enables individuals to have heterogeneous tastes by changing the thresholds of
each payment method. This model is called mixed logit, heterogeneous logit, or random
coecients model.19
The other heterogeneity parameter, i, is a scale heterogeneity. To emphasize the impor-
tance of i, again, assume  = 0. Then, equation (2) can be rewritten as
im = i( m + im); where im  N(0; um):
18As Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, and Wasi (2010) mention, there is no good economic interpretation for .
19This model can be seen as one of the random eects models. The reason we use a random eects model
here is the fact that we can only have several observations for most of the samples. In order to deal with
this heterogeneity as xed eects, we need to have more observations per each individual.
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As the name suggests, the scale heterogeneity is indeed scaled up or down the valuation
for the particular choice, which is constant across m, and can capture the committed users'
behavior well.
Notice that this class of model includes a lot of models as special cases, as indicated
above. For example, assuming i = 1 and 
u
m = 0 for all m, this model boils down to
the simplest (multinomial) logit model. Also, as mentioned above, assuming i = 1, this
model will be identical to the models in Revelt and Train (1998), i.e., im can be simplied as
im = m+im, which is the standard mixed logit or heterogeneous logit model. In this study,
we assume that  = 0, which gives us im = i( m+im) and we call i a scale heterogeneity
and im random coecients. Moreover, we also assume that the variance-covariance matrix
of i is diagonal to ease computational complexity.
A scale coecient might be explained by the individual demographic information. For
example, credit card users are likely to have high income. Thus, the scale heterogeneity for
credit cards might be explained by users' income. Generally speaking, if we want to explain
 with some demographic information, it can be written as
i = exp( +Qi
q + i0) (4)
where Qi denotes the individual demographics, such as income or age, which might explain
the scale heterogeneity, and q is a coecient vector. This seemingly slight change requires
huge computational complexity, because we need to nd  that satisesZ
i0
exp( +Qi
q + i0)dF (i0) = 1;
as a normalization.20 Thus, rst we need to nd  as a function of the parameter values of
, including  , and then we plug  into the equation to simulate the choice probabilities.
The choice set for consumer i at shopping opportunity t is dened by Jit. Fortunately,
we can observe this information in the data. Although it might have measurement errors,
we can observe the consumers' \perceived" acceptance at the time of transaction and we use
20In order to identify multiplicative heterogeneity, one of the heterogeneity parameters should be normal-
ized. See Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, and Wasi (2010).
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that information to limit the choice set for consumers. Moreover, we can observe whether
consumer i owns any credit or debit cards. Thus, if individual i does not have credit and/or
debit cards, we exclude credit or debit cards from individual i's choice set.
3.2 A Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimator
Given the parameter values  = ffj; fmj; umjgm=1; ;Mj ; jgj=CC;DCg, where CC and DC
denote the credit card and debit card, and a pair of random draws of (i;i) that are xed
over the estimation procedure, we can obtain the analytical choice probability of individual
i choosing payment method j at shopping trip t as
P(yijt = 1jX ijt;; i;i) =
exp(j +X
0
ijti)P
l2Jit exp(l +X
0
ilti)
; (5)
where
yijt =
8><>:1; if i choose option j at shopping trip t,0; otherwise:
Notice that the denominator in equation (5) is a summation over available choices. For
example, if a choice set only includes cash and debit card, the denominator is a summation
of exponentiated utility from cash usage and debit card usage. Using this choice probability,
the likelihood contribution for each individual is given by:
Li() =
Z
(i;i)
TiY
t=1
Y
j
[P(yijt = 1jX ijt;; i;i)]dijtdF (i;i); (6)
where dijt is the observed decision dened by
dijt =
8><>:1; if i choose option j at a shopping trip t,0; otherwise:
As in equation (6), the individual likelihood contribution is a product over the shopping trips
for Ti times. In other words, we stack multiple transactions at the individual level. In this
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way, we can capture the individual heterogeneity. If we do not stack multiple transactions at
the individual level, the model is unable to capture individual heterogeneity and is identical
to assuming that each transaction is independent and identically distributed.
Unfortunately, we cannot directly calculate this likelihood function, and thus we use the
simulation technique to approximate it. Namely, suppose a random draw is indexed by s,
i.e., we have fsi ;sigs=1; ;S for each individual. Then, the likelihood contribution for each
individual should be approximated by
Li()  1
S
SX
s=1
TiY
t=1
Y
j
[P(yijt = 1jX ijt;; si ;si )]dijt
which enables us to dene the simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimator given by:
^
SML
= argmax

NX
i=1
wi log(Li())
Notice that the log likelihood value is weighted by wi to correct the sampling bias, as dis-
cussed in Section 2. The standard errors reported in this study are calculated by
Avar(^
SML
) =
NX
i=1
wisi(^
SML
)0si(^
SML
);
where s(^
SML
) is a score vector evaluated at ^
SML
. Notice, again, that we need to take into
account the sample weight to adjust the sampling bias. Under regularity conditions, this
estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal.
4 Results
4.1 Estimation Results
This section provides the estimation results, focusing on the dierences among alternative
modelings. To emphasize the importance of each heterogeneity, we estimate six variations
of the model, summarized in Table 4. In order to address the importance of the \perceived
acceptance," we estimate the model with and without limiting consumers' choice sets based
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on their reported perceived acceptance. Furthermore, to understand the dierence between
transaction-level and individual-level data, we estimate the model at transactional level,
assuming each transaction is i.i.d, and individual level storing the multiple transactions per
subject. Finally, to see the importance of variations of individual heterogeneity, we estimate
four models with and without including  and . As for simulation, we use 500 sets of
random draws per subject, i.e., fsi ;sigi=1; ;N ;s=1; ;500.21
Parameter Values and Statistics Tables 5 and 6 show the estimation results and some
summary statistics. As mentioned in Section 3, we normalize the utility of using cash to
zero. Thus, we show the coecients for credit and debit cards, listing the included variables
in the rst column of each table. Each coecient is interpreted as follows: Transaction value
(abbreviated as TV in the rst column) and its squared term for credit cards is positive
and negative, respectively, implying that the utility of using credit cards is increasing in
transaction values with marginally decreasing. Those people who valuate the ease of use
and record keeping facility of credit cards are likely to use credit cards, since the utility of
using credit cards is higher. Estimation results also suggest that if people have multiple
credit cards, a higher credit limit, or higher reward points for their primary credit cards,
their latent utility of using credit cards is high. On the other hand, when people face very
low transaction values or are young, they are less likely to use credit cards.
As for debit card usage, consumers are more likely to use debit cards, if the transaction
value is very low, or if consumers are young and have less income. On the other hand, as
transaction values increase, or if the transactions took place at a grocery store, and consumers
have multiple debit cards or evaluate debit cards' ease of use and record keeping facility, then
they are more likely to use debit cards. Although the magnitude of signicance might change
across the models, these coecients basically show the same sign and statistical signicance.
In terms of the summary statistics, the values of log likelihood, AIC and BIC improve
by limiting the choice sets, shifting from Model (i) to Model (ii). Notice that the estimation
results for Models (ii) and (iii) are the same, as the objective functions are identical when
the models do not have any random coecients. Although the estimates are the same, the
21 Revelt and Train (1998) use the same number of simulations for their estimation procedure. Notice
that the estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal under regularity conditions.
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standard errors should be dierent as indicated in Table 5. Thus, without taking into account
the unobserved individual-specic eects, the usage of transaction-level and individual-level
data should yield the same estimates.22
When we introduce the heterogeneity terms in Models (iv) to (vi), the log likelihood,
AIC and BIC further improve dramatically as indicated in Table 6.23 In Model (iv), we
introduce a scale coecient and it is indeed statistically signicant. Moreover, in Model (v),
we use the random coecients for transaction values, ease of use, and so on. In Table 6,
`RC' indicates a random coecient and the bold numbers indicate statistical signicance at
the 5% level. Although some random coecients are statistically insignicant, more than
half of the random coecients are statistically signicant, implying that consumers' valua-
tions for payment characteristics are quite heterogeneous. Furthermore, we introduce both
random and scale coecients in Model (vi). Again, most of the parameters are statistically
signicant.
As for the statistical tness of the model, we present AIC and BIC at the bottom of
Tables 5 and 6. Models (i) to (iii) force everybody to have homogeneous taste parameters,
and these models show relatively larger AIC and BIC than Models (iv) to (vi). Thus, the
statistical tness of the model and the statistical signicance of some random coecient
terms indicate the importance of individual heterogeneity. Model (vi) achieves the smallest
log-likelihood, AIC, and BIC. These statistics for the tness of the models are enough for
us to proceed to the counterfactual simulations, we also show some predicted probabilities
using the estimated models to show other aspects of the tness of the models.
Predicted Probabilities Table 7 demonstrates the overall tness of the estimated models.
Each column shows the shares of cash, credit and debit cards in terms of the frequency
(volume) share in the top three rows and value share in the bottom three rows. Since the
objective function of the models is based on the individual log-likelihood contribution, we use
the weight multiplied by the number of transactions per person. That is, we use wP = wiTi,
where Ti is the total number of shopping trips that individual i had, and the estimated
22You can also see these results analytically.
23When adding more parameters in a statistical model, the statistical goodness of t, say likelihood value,
may improve. Thus, the Akaike information criterion and the Bayesian information criterion solve this
problem by having a penalty term for the number of parameters.
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parameters to calculate the predicted shares.24
Model (iii) or (vi) can be seen as one of the most promising models in Table 7, as
both models mimic the data quite well in both frequency and values share. At the same
time, other models also mimic each share within almost 1% range. Moreover, even for
value shares that we do not match directly in the estimation procedure, these four models
mimic the data well. However, Table 8 suggests that Model (iii) cannot give good tness for
micro-moments; in particular, the model cannot capture the substitution between cash and
debit card. Table 8 shows the tness of the model conditioned on merchants' acceptance.
In the top panel, `Merchants Accepting Cash and Credit,' we calculate the frequency and
value share where merchants accept only cash and credit cards. Unfortunately, all models
predict higher numbers for cash usage. On the other hand, in the bottom panel, `Merchants
Accepting Cash and Debit,' as we include more unobserved heterogeneity, these models
capture the substitution between cash and debit cards quite well. For example, cash usage
is about 64.22% in the data, and Model (vi) predicts 61.91% for `Merchants Accepting Cash
and Debit.' These observations allow us to proceed to the counterfactual simulations using
these estimated models and parameters.
4.2 Simulation Results
Using the estimated model demonstrated above, we conduct a policy simulation where all
merchants accept any payment method regardless of transaction values. This question is
motivated by policy makers' recent interest in understanding the demand for cash under
such a counterfactual scenario, as many recent studies reveal that cash is still a dominant
payment method for small-value transactions.
Simulation Details We hypothetically allow consumers to use their credit and debit
cards without incurring any additional costs for using them, even though, in reality, they
24Each predicted share can be obtained via:
sFj =
NX
i=1
TiX
t=1
"
1
R
RX
r=1
wPP(yijt = 1jXijt;; ri ; ri )
#
where R = 1; 000 and each choice probability is given by Equation (5).
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sometimes would not be able to use their cards. We also assume that all consumers can
use debit and credit cards. For those consumers who do not have any credit cards, we
hypothetically give them a credit card with zero rewards and the lowest credit limit, i.e.,
$500. For those consumers who do not have any debit cards, we hypothetically give them
a debit card so that they can use their debit cards for any transaction. To conduct this
policy experiment, we use the fact that the estimator satises asymptotic normality. Thus,
we prepare r = 2; 000 sets of normal random draws of r and construct r = ^ + ^r,
where ^ and ^ denote the estimates and standard errors for the estimates. We also prepare
the r = 2; 000 draws for each random coecient and scale coecient, (r;r). Then, we
simulate the choice probabilities for all methods of payment, whereas consumers' choice sets
are restricted by merchants' acceptance in the estimation. Finally, we subtract the former
predicted shares from the latter predicted shares.25 Notice that we use the weight wi here,
whereas we use the `weighted' weight for showing the tness of the models, as in Tables 7
and 8, i.e., the predicted shares are calculated via
sCj =
NX
i=1
TiX
t=1
"
1
R
RX
r=1
wiP(yijt = 1jX ijt;r; ri ;ri )
#
:
4.2.1 Overall Eects
Table 9 presents an overview of the simulation results. First, in terms of the frequency, overall
cash usage would decrease by 6.9 percentage points to 8.0 percentage points, depending on
the model, whereas the transaction amount of cash usage would decrease by 6.9 percentage
points to 7.9 percentage points. The most important observation here is that the dominance
of cash usage in small-value transactions is driven by consumers { consumers would not
decrease their use of cash even if merchants accepted credit and debit cards. Although one
might think this change is relatively small, this small overall eect is driven by the fact that
many people use cash for small-value transactions even if these merchants accept cards, as
indicated in Figure 6. The right panel of Figure 6 shows the frequencies of three methods of
payment by transaction values only transactions that accepted all three method of payment,
25 As indicated in Table 7, the predictions from the models cannot predict the data shares exactly. Thus, we
calculate the dierence between predicted shares under the current choice sets and under the counterfactual
choice sets.
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whereas the left panel includes all transactions.
There is one more important remark about Table 9. The table indicates the importance
of the unobserved individual heterogeneity. The decrease in cash usage is smaller in Model
(iii), which does not have any unobserved heterogeneity, than in other models that have
heterogeneity. This result implies that Model (iii) fails to capture the behavior of debit
users and credit users. Those committed users should be likely to use their cards under
the counterfactual situation where all merchants accept cards, and Models (iv) through (vi)
capture such patterns. However, Model (iii) does not have any individual-level heterogeneity
and cannot capture such patterns.
4.2.2 Detailed Eects
Acceptance Types In Table 10, we show the models' prediction depending on the mer-
chants acceptance. For example, in the top panel, `Merchants Accepting Cash,' we calculate
the percentage point change only for the merchants that currently accept only cash. For
those transactions, the decrease in cash usage is huge, since many consumers would use
credit and debit cards if merchants accepted cards. Thus, cash share would decrease by
about 34 percentage points.
On the other hand, in the next two panels `Merchants Accepting Cash and Credit' and
`Merchants Accepting Cash and Debit,' we can see much smaller changes. This is partially
because merchants have already accepted cash and one electronic payment method. However,
here, we can see the clear dierence between Model (iii) and Model (vi). For example, Model
(iii) predicts decreases of about 11.49 percentage points and 5.21 percentage points for cash
and credit card share, whereas Model (vi) predicts decreases of about 13.96 percentage points
and 3.61 percentage points for cash and credit card. This is because, in this case, we should
expect that the most substitutions would happen from cash share to debit card share, with
a slight decrease in credit cards share. Some mixed users, who wanted to use debit cards
but could not because they were not accepted and used credit cards instead, would use debit
cards, which leads to a small decrease in credit usage. However, the number of such mixed
users should be small and the eect should be limited. Therefore, we should expect most of
the decrease in cash and the Model (vi) support our intuitions. The same thing happens for
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merchants that accept cash and debit cards.
Last, in the bottom panel, which shows merchants accepting every payment method
already, the changes are very limited for any payment method and any model. This is
because the merchants have already accepted any payment method and consumers choose
their method of payment optimally. Therefore, we should not see huge changes here and the
results validate the models.
Transaction Values In Table 11, we show the models' prediction depending on the trans-
action values. For instance, in the top panel, `Less than $10,' we calculate the percentage
point change only for the transactions which are less than $10. Though the market share
of cash in the data is quite huge for less than $10 transactions, the percentage change is
small. On the other hand, transactions between $10 and $25, the decreases are about 10
percentage points, even though the original market share is much smaller than less than
$10 transactions. Therefore, these observations support that the results { cash usage in
small-value transactions is driven by consumers { is robust.
4.3 Some Discussions
As mentioned in Sections 2 and 3, there may exist some potential endogenity problems in
the estimation and the counterfactual simulation. We summarize and discuss them briey
in this section.
Measurement Errors in Perceived Acceptance and Endogeneity First, we use the
reported perceived acceptance data, which may have measurement errors, since consumers
tend to go to merchants that are likely to accept their preferred method of payment and
report inaccurately about acceptance of their non-preferred method of payment. Unfor-
tunately, in these data, we cannot verify whether their reported acceptances are correct.
However, as in Table 3, we do have a number of observations where some merchants accept
only credit cards or debit cards, which validate the accuracy of data. Thus, this paper uses
their reported perceived acceptance without any imputation.
This perceived acceptance might create a bias in the counterfactual experiment. In
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particular, when we measure the welfare gain in the counterfactual experiment, we might
underestimate it. As indicated in Table 3, currently many consumers choose shops that
accept their preferred method of payment, e.g., credit users are more likely to go to merchants
that accept credit cards. However, under the counterfactual scenario, they would not have
to choose merchants by their acceptance. Since this paper does not measure the welfare
gain/loss, this problem cannot be a major concern.
There might be another concern of a selection problem of credit cards. As Arango,
Huynh, and Sabetti (2011) investigate, those consumers who tend to use their credit cards
are likely to have good reward programs on their cards. Under the couterfactual scenario,
some cash users and debit users might obtain new credit cards which have better reward
programs and start using them. This model cannot capture such behavior, as their credit
card selection behavior is not explicitly modeled. Therefore, the results indicated above
should be interpret as a short term eect where consumers continue to use the same credit
cards.
Supply Eects and Externalities Finally, this paper cannot capture any externalities
in the counterfactual simulation. For example, as a result of forcing merchants to accept
electronic cards, merchants might get used to processing cards and therefore the speed of
settlement for these cards would be faster than before. Observing this faster settlement for
cards, consumers might use cards more frequently. This is one of the externalities for forcing
merchants to accept cards.
Moreover, the models do not take into account merchants' behavior nor the behavior of
credit and debit card network providers. They might potentially change their behavior, in
particular, they might charge higher interchange and surcharge fees to exploit their monop-
olistic or oligopolistic market power. To fully predict what would happen if merchants were
forced to accept cards, we need to take into account their behavior.
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5 Conclusion
This paper investigates consumers' method of payment choices. To exploit the individual
heterogeneity in payment choice, we use a generalized multinomial logit model, taking advan-
tage of the data where we can observe multiple transactions for each individual. Moreover,
\perceived" acceptance, which partially gives supply-side information, enables us to sepa-
rately identify demand-side factors from the supply-side factors. Estimation results conrm
that such unobserved heterogeneity in method of payment choice is indeed signicant both
statistically and economically. Using the estimated model, we conduct the counterfactual
simulation where all merchants accept cards regardless of transaction values. Simulation
results show that cash usage would indeed decrease but the magnitude is quite limited: cash
usage decreases at most about 8 percentage points in frequency share. The implication of
this result is that current cash usage is driven by demand-side factors { consumers prefer
using cash, in particular, for small-value transactions.
As this paper focuses on consumer's method of payment choice, we abstract from other
potential issues listed in Section 4. Considering issues, e.g., competition among network
providers or measurement error in choice sets, would be an interesting extension for future
research.
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Figure 1: Method of Payment Choice by Transaction Value
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Note: This gure is based on 7,908 transactions.
Table 1: Histogram of the Number of Shopping Opportunities
Before Truncation After Truncation
Raw Raw Weighted Raw Raw Weighed
Freq. Percent Percent Freq. Percent Percent
1 456 19.52 18.84 - - -
2 428 18.32 18.48 - - -
3 361 15.45 13.30 361 24.86 21.21
4 289 12.37 13.22 289 19.90 21.09
5 247 10.57 11.74 247 17.01 18.73
6 180 7.71 7.86 180 12.40 12.55
7 120 5.14 6.38 120 8.26 10.08
8 91 3.90 3.47 91 6.27 5.54
9+ 164 7.02 6.71 164 11.29 10.80
Total 2,336 100.00 100.00 1,452 100.00 100.00
Note: `Raw Percent' and `Weighted Percent' indicate whether or not I use the sample
weights to correct the sampling bias in the data, respectively. `Before Truncation' and
`After Truncation' indicate whether or not these samples are truncated by a criterion
of having more than 2 shopping trips.
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Table 2: Patterns of Payment Choice
Samples with more than
2 shopping opportunities
#of Weighted avg # of avg
Type of Consumers obs. % shopping TV
(1) Cash Users 244 21.81 4.45 16.58
(2) Debit Users
Only Debit 65 4.47 4.43 39.65
Cash & Debit 455 31.26 5.45 26.53
(3) Credit Users
Only Credit 60 3.24 4.40 43.84
Cash & Credit 360 22.82 5.52 29.26
(4) Mixed Users
Debit & Credit 49 2.96 4.18 39.73
All three 219 13.44 7.30 33.54
Total # of individuals 1,452 5.45
Total # of transactions 7,908 28.66
Note: Each row shows the types of consumers, and each column shows the number of
observations, the average numbers of shopping opportunities, and average transaction
values.
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Figure 2: Transaction Value Distributions
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Note: As indicated in each graph, top-left, top-right, bottom-left, and bottom-right panes show the
transaction value distributions for each consumer type.
Figure 3: Methods of Payment by Consumer Type
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Note: The left, center, and right panel show the frequency of payment choices by transaction value,
for credit, debit, and mixed users, respectively.
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Figure 4: Ease of Use Figure 5: Record Keeping
Note: The left graph shows the 3-dimensional histogram of ease-of-use for credit and debit cards relative to cash.
Similarly, the right graph shows the 3-dimensional histogram of consumers perception of record keeping facility for
credit and debit cards relative to cash.
Table 4: Variations of Estimated Models
Model
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
(1) Transaction/Individual Trans. Trans. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind.
(2) Choice Sets Unlimited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited
(3) Scale Hetero. () No No No Yes No Yes
(4) Random Coe. () No No No No Yes Yes
Note: In the rst row, `Trans.' means that I use transactional-level data, assuming each transaction is inde-
pendent and identically distributed and `Ind.' means that I stack multiple observations for each individual to
extract individual heterogeneity. In the second row, `limited' and `Unlimited' stand for limiting and not limiting
choice sets by perceived acceptance data reported by respondents.
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Table 5: Estimation Results 1/2
Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii)
Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Credit Cards
Constant -3.0099 0.2491 -2.4129 0.2582 -2.4129 0.1638
TV 1.1451 0.0936 1.1125 0.1189 1.1125 0.0783
TV sq -0.2733 0.0318 -0.2337 0.0517 -0.2337 0.0394
Less than $5 -1.5953 0.2067 -1.4850 0.2128 -1.4850 0.2200
Less than $10 -0.9901 0.1393 -0.8560 0.1500 -0.8560 0.1372
Grocery Store -0.01646 0.1054 -0.4068 0.1112 -0.4068 0.0881
Entertainment -0.4971 0.1123 -0.6468 0.1237 -0.6468 0.1131
Age -1.5787 0.1561 -1.2256 0.1676 -1.2256 0.1145
Income 0.1654 0.1023 0.2192 0.1096 0.21917 0.0727
Ease of Use 0.0882 0.0155 0.1039 0.0172 0.1039 0.0103
Record Keeping 0.4444 0.0543 0.4968 0.0590 0.4968 0.0381
Num. of CC 0.1780 0.0571 0.1493 0.0616 0.1493 0.0405
Credit Reward 0.1102 0.0289 0.1654 0.0287 0.1654 0.0174
Credit Limit 2.0117 0.1473 1.5700 0.1505 1.5700 0.1010
RC for TV { { { { { {
RC for Ease { { { { { {
RC for Record { { { { { {
RC for Num. CC { { { { { {
RC for Rewards { { { { { {
RC for C Limit { { { { { {
Scale Coe. { { { { { {
Debit Cards
Constant -0.1693 0.1943 0.2316 0.2056 0.2316 0.1393
TV 0.8697 0.0864 0.8684 0.1087 0.8684 0.0558
TV sq -0.2320 0.0315 -0.2070 0.0489 -0.2070 0.0329
Less than $5 -1.1890 0.1380 -1.0181 0.1424 -1.0181 0.1389
Less than $10 -0.8779 0.1118 -0.8427 0.1190 -0.8427 0.1097
Grocery Store 0.7652 0.0870 0.3927 0.0910 0.3927 0.0790
Entertainment -0.1574 0.0995 -0.3056 0.1060 -0.3056 0.0886
Age -1.3127 0.1260 -1.1877 0.1319 -1.1877 0.0906
Income -0.3166 0.0767 -0.3562 0.0818 -0.3562 0.0552
Ease of Use 0.0999 0.0158 0.1094 0.0172 0.1094 0.0116
Record Keeping 0.1548 0.0449 0.2293 0.0483 0.2293 0.0310
Num. of DC 0.4817 0.0646 0.4212 0.0682 0.4211 0.0445
RC for TV { { { { { {
RC for Ease { { { { { {
RC for Record { { { { { {
RC for Num DCs { { { { { {
Scale Coe. { { { { { {
Summary Statistics
No. of Param. 26 26 26
Log Likelihood -5420.2 -4694.7 -4694.7
AIC 10892 9441.5 9441.5
BIC 11074 9622.9 9578.8
Note: The bold numbers in the estimates columns are statistically signicant at the 5% level.
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Table 6: Estimation Results 2/2 (Continued)
Model (iv) Model (v) Model (vi)
Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Credit Cards
Constant -4.6344 0.4396 -3.5565 0.4551 -3.5420 0.4901
TV 1.7639 0.1542 1.7726 0.1558 1.6815 0.1656
TV sq -0.3526 0.0995 -0.3177 0.0820 -0.3119 0.0749
Less than $5 -1.1668 0.8146 -2.0460 0.3124 -2.0309 0.3138
Less than $10 -0.8620 0.2731 -1.4553 0.2199 -1.4935 0.2204
Grocery Store -0.4510 0.1528 -0.7376 0.1671 -0.7305 0.1680
Entertainment -0.9530 0.1820 -1.2977 0.1743 -1.3001 0.1784
Age -0.6100 0.2234 -1.5259 0.3996 -1.4413 0.4005
Income 0.5825 0.1433 0.6159 0.2393 0.6415 0.2403
Ease of Use 0.0023 0.0310 0.1508 0.0949 0.1743 0.0969
Record Keeping 0.4492 0.0766 0.7474 0.1659 0.7970 0.1414
Num. of CC 0.2622 0.0788 0.3608 0.2038 0.2809 0.1722
Credit Reward 0.3717 0.0413 0.4113 0.1645 0.4135 0.1553
Credit Limit 2.0087 0.2180 1.2755 0.4348 1.3860 0.4184
RC for TV { { -0.4567 0.1875 0.2108 0.2982
RC for Ease { { -0.3803 0.0912 -0.4017 0.0985
RC for Record { { -0.1079 0.5921 { {
RC for Num. CC { { -0.1824 0.6545 { {
RC for Rewards { { 0.8540 0.2385 0.8210 0.2201
RC for C Limit { { 1.8205 0.2132 -1.5863 0.2161
Scale for CC -0.5342 0.0457 -0.2338 0.0956
Debit Cards
Constant 3.5675 0.1958 1.2762 0.4338 1.8895 0.2457
TV 0.8172 0.1023 1.0749 0.1065 1.3615 0.1678
TV sq -0.1400 0.0403 -0.2242 0.0537 -0.2832 0.0648
Less than $5 -3.1921 0.4493 -1.2917 0.1846 -3.4816 0.5343
Less than $10 -2.9933 0.3666 -1.3868 0.1729 -2.5528 0.3903
Grocery Store 0.5807 0.1432 0.5748 0.1249 0.8743 0.1947
Entertainment -1.1524 0.2475 -0.4254 0.1441 -1.0243 0.2734
Age -3.8548 0.2946 -2.1717 0.2712 -3.5558 0.3947
Income -1.2672 0.1929 -0.8009 0.1777 -1.3882 0.2832
Ease of Use 0.1708 0.0194 0.1595 0.0656 0.2283 0.0458
Record Keeping 0.2036 0.1156 0.2708 0.1603 0.2956 0.2694
Num. of DC -0.3539 0.1721 0.2548 0.3328 0.5346 0.3807
RC for TV { { 0.4337 0.1619 0.3723 0.2217
RC for Ease { { -0.1539 0.1284 { {
RC for Record { { -0.6375 0.2422 -1.7222 0.3034
RC for Num DCs { { 2.0838 0.1927 2.1846 0.3294
Scale for DC -0.6707 0.0389 -0.7431 0.0570
Summary Statistics
No. of Param. 28 36 35
Log Likelihood -4071.2 -3972.1 -3948.6
AIC 8198.5 8016.1 7967.3
BIC 8346.3 8206.2 8152.1
Note: The bold numbers in the estimates columns are statistically signicant at the 5% level.
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Table 7: Model Fit - Overall Fitness
Model Prediction
Data Model (iii) Model (iv) Model (v) Model (vi)
Frequency Share
Cash 57.20% 56.21% 56.72% 56.55% 56.48%
Credit 18.61% 18.61% 19.01% 19.37% 19.17%
Debit 24.19% 25.18% 24.27% 24.07% 24.35%
Value Share
Cash 30.48% 30.27% 32.24% 31.56% 31.27%
Credit 34.83% 34.51% 34.85% 35.25% 35.00%
Debit 34.69% 35.22% 32.92% 33.19% 33.73%
Note: As indicated in Table 4, Model (iii) does not include any individual heterogeneity, whereas Model
(iv) includes scale coecients and Model (v) includes random coecients. Model (vi) includes both
random and scale coecients. Indicated numbers are frequency and volume shares of each payment
method.
Table 8: Model Fit - By Merchants' Acceptance
Model Prediction
Data Model (iii) Model (iv) Model (v) Model (vi)
Merchants Accepting Cash and Credit
Frequency Share
Cash 66.36% 73.53% 74.92% 74.97% 74.86%
Credit 33.64% 26.47% 25.08% 25.03% 25.14%
Value Share
Cash 26.81% 40.84% 43.60% 44.22% 41.99%
Credit 73.19% 59.16% 56.40% 55.78% 58.01%
Merchants Accepting Cash and Debit
Frequency Share
Cash 64.22% 59.81% 60.70% 62.53% 61.91%
Debit 35.78% 40.19% 39.30% 37.47% 38.09%
Value Share
Cash 37.39% 33.97% 37.59% 40.90% 39.57%
Debit 62.61% 66.03% 62.41% 59.10% 60.43%
Note: As indicated in Table 4, Model (iii) does not include any individual heterogeneity, whereas Model
(iv) includes scale coecients and Model (v) includes random coecients. Model (vi) includes both
random and scale coecients. Indicated numbers are frequency and volume shares of each payment
method.
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Table 9: Simulation results for overall eects
Model Prediction
Data Model (iii) Model (iv) Model (v) Model (vi)
Frequency Share
Cash 56.99% -6.86% -7.58% -7.98% -7.70%
Credit 18.91% 3.69% 4.17% 4.76% 4.38%
Debit 24.10% 3.18% 3.41% 3.22% 3.32%
Value Share
Cash 30.06% -6.93% -7.55% -7.86% -7.53%
Credit 36.01% 4.34% 5.57% 5.87% 5.21%
Debit 33.93% 2.58% 1.98% 1.99% 2.33%
Note: The displayed numbers in `Model Prediction' columns are percentage point changes which are
calculated as the dierence between the predicted market share under the current choice sets and the
predicted market share under the counterfactual choice sets.
Figure 6: Method of Payment Choices by Acceptance
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
1
D
en
si
ty
0 25 50 75 100
Transaction Value
Cash Credit
Debit
All Transactions
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
1
D
en
si
ty
0 25 50 75 100
Transaction Value
Cash Credit
Debit
Transactions Accept All Methods
Note: The left panel shows the three methods' frequency by transaction values for all transac-
tions (it is identical to Figure 1), whereas the right panel shows the three methods' frequency
for transactions that accept all three methods.
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Table 10: Simulation Results - By Merchants' Acceptance
Model Prediction
Data Model (iii) Model (iv) Model (v) Model (vi)
Merchants Accepting Cash
Frequency Share
Cash 100.00% -32.85% -34.64% -34.39% -34.31%
Credit 0.00% 14.51% 15.36% 16.49% 15.87%
Debit 0.00% 18.35% 19.28% 17.90% 18.45%
Value Share
Cash 100.00% -67.66% -66.77% -67.71% -67.70%
Credit 0.00% 33.08% 34.57% 35.96% 34.64%
Debit 0.00% 34.58% 32.20% 31.74% 33.06%
Merchants Accepting Cash and Credit
Frequency Share
Cash 68.55% -11.49% -15.27% -14.38% -13.96%
Credit 31.45% -5.21% -3.81% -2.68% -3.61%
Debit 0.00% 16.69% 19.08% 17.06% 17.58%
Value Share
Cash 28.88% -7.61% -13.38% -12.38% -9.61%
Credit 71.12% -12.86% -10.17% -9.91% -12.18%
Debit 0.00% 20.47% 23.55% 22.29% 21.79%
Merchants Accepting Cash and Debit
Frequency Share
Cash 65.42% -4.80% -6.67% -7.39% -6.92%
Credit 0.00% 8.55% 10.23% 10.60% 10.09%
Debit 34.58% -3.76% -3.55% -3.21% -3.17%
Value Share
Cash 39.74% -4.59% -8.82% -11.01% -10.08%
Credit 0.00% 14.64% 20.58% 22.20% 20.67%
Debit 60.26% -10.05% -11.76% -11.20% -10.59%
Merchants Accepting Every Method
Frequency Share
Cash 42.24% -0.23% -0.11% -0.69% -0.41%
Credit 28.70% -0.04% -0.07% 0.41% 0.17%
Debit 29.05% 0.26% 0.18% 0.27% 0.24%
Value Share
Cash 19.43% -0.01% 0.19% 0.32% 0.46%
Credit 47.01% -0.77% -0.67% -0.80% -1.13%
Debit 33.56% 0.78% 0.48% 0.48% 0.67%
Note: The displayed numbers in `Model Prediction' columns are percentage point changes which are calcu-
lated as the dierence between the predicted market share under the current choice sets and the predicted
market share under the counterfactual choice sets.
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Table 11: Simulation Results - By Transaction Values
Model Prediction
Data Model (iii) Model (iv) Model (v) Model (vi)
Less Than $10
Frequency Share
Cash 85.44% -6.19% -7.29% -8.11% -7.46%
Credit 4.68% 2.87% 3.53% 4.32% 3.79%
Debit 9.88% 3.33% 3.76% 3.79% 3.68%
Value Share
Cash 79.04% -6.31% -6.96% -7.85% -7.34%
Credit 7.05% 3.21% 3.62% 4.48% 3.96%
Debit 13.91% 3.10% 3.33% 3.38% 3.38%
Between $10 and $25
Frequency Share
Cash 52.34% -9.04% -9.53% -9.73% -9.77%
Credit 17.20% 4.90% 4.45% 5.57% 5.32%
Debit 30.46% 4.14% 5.08% 4.16% 4.45%
Value Share
Cash 50.65% -8.36% -8.76% -8.98% -9.02%
Credit 18.00% 4.58% 4.21% 5.23% 5.01%
Debit 31.34% 3.78% 4.55% 3.75% 4.01%
More than $25
Frequency Share
Cash 26.95% -6.00% -6.45% -6.52% -6.42%
Credit 37.00% 3.73% 4.71% 4.68% 4.37%
Debit 36.05% 2.27% 1.74% 1.84% 2.04%
Value Share
Cash 22.49% -6.72% -7.38% -7.66% -7.28%
Credit 41.55% 4.39% 5.97% 6.10% 5.34%
Debit 35.96% 2.33% 1.40% 1.56% 1.94%
Note: The displayed numbers in `Model Prediction' columns are percentage point changes which are calcu-
lated as the dierence between the predicted market share under the current choice sets and the predicted
market share under the counterfactual choice sets.
37
Appendix: Sample Construction
Originally, the number of individuals who completed the diary survey instrument (DSI) is
3,253. To construct the estimation samples, we rst drop 348 individuals who did not an-
swer some attitudinal questions or who were missing some important demographic variables.
These operations leave 2,905 individuals with 16,135 transactions.
As a second step, we drop some transactions if missing transaction values (1,674 trans-
actions), if missing decision (54 transactions), if using multiple transaction methods (161
transactions), if using checks or store-value cards (300 transactions), if missing perceived
acceptance (4,111 transactions), if inconsistent with decision and choice sets (299 transac-
tions), if unable to use cash (208 transactions), if transaction value is more than $300 (103
transactions). These operations leave 2,336 individuals with 9,220 transactions.26
Along the process, the biggest drop has occurred as a result of missing perceived ac-
ceptance. One potential concern is that those who do not report the perceived acceptance
might be correlated with transaction values, which is the most important determinant in
payment choices economically and statistically. As we can easily imagine, for small-value
transactions, respondents might not know their acceptance and might more likely answer 'I
do not know.' If this is true, this process would create some problems. However, as Figure
7 indicates, the distributions of transaction values look similar. We might be able to impute
the acceptance based on transaction values, the number of cashiers at each merchant, and
shopping type. However, we will not take this approach as this perceived acceptance is one
of the key variables and it seems there is no systematic correlation at least for transaction
values.
Finally, for identication purposes, we drop 884 individuals with 1,312 transactions, since
they had only one or two shopping records. This nal operation yields 1,452 individuals with
7,908 transactions. Again, we also show two distributions for transaction values, which stay
26569 respondents have been dropped during these operations, as they have zero transactions which can
be used for the estimation.
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in the sample and are dropped from the sample in Figure 8. These two kernel density
estimates suggest that both distributions are similar and we can estimate the models with
1,452 individuals without any problems, since they are representative.
Figure 7: Transaction Value Distributions
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Note: The black solid line shows the distribution of transac-
tion values when consumers answer `I know the acceptance'
and the blue dotted line shows the distribution of transaction
values when consumers report `I do NOT know the accep-
tance,' which we drop from our estimation sample.
Figure 8: Transaction Value Distributions
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Note: The black solid line shows the distribution of transac-
tion values that we use for this paper and the blue dotted line
shows the distribution of transaction values that we drop from
our estimation samples.
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